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OHIO INTERSTATE HIGHWAY ADVERTISING
PROHIBITION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston
89 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 20 Ohio Op. 2d Si, 184 N.E.2d 552 (C.P. 1962)
Property owners brought a proceeding to enjoin the Director of
Highways from enforcing the sections of the Ohio Revised Code I which
prohibit outdoor advertising signs within 660 feet of the right of way of
an interstate highway, and for a declaratory judgment as to whether such
sections are constitutional under the Ohio and federal constitutions. The
action was consolidated for trial with two actions by the Director of
Highways for an order to abate as a nuisance, under authority of the above
sections, several billboards located on interstate highways. The Court of
Common Pleas for Allen County held that the statutes in question were
unconstitutional and void under sections 1 and 19 of article I of the Ohio
Constitution and void under section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. The court reasoned that the
restriction on the use of property without compensation constituted an
unwarranted taking because the use of the land for advertising purposes
had been disrupted and the evidence failed to show that the statute had
any relation to highway safety. The Ohio statutes were, therefore, an
unconstitutional exercise of the state's police power in violation of sub-
stantive due process.2 The court also found that the statutes denied the
owners equal protection of the law as guaranteed under the Ohio and
federal constitutions.3
One of the prime motivating forces in the adoption of anti-billboard
statutes is the provision in the Federal Highway Act of 1958 for a cash
bonus of one half of one percent of the federal contribution to the inter-
state highway cost for states which adopt statutes under authority of their
police powers restricting advertising in the manner required in the act.4
An alternative method of regulation under the act provides federal funds
1 Ohio Revised Code §5516.01 to §5516.05 inclusive and §5516.99.
2 Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 51,
184 N.E. 2d. 552 (C.P. Allen County, 1962). Studies conducted on the influence of
advertising devices have been inconclusive and show if anything that the relationship
between advertising devices along highways and accidents thereon is neglible. Id at
22, 184 N.E. 2d at 557.
3 The statute forbids advertising on the interstate routes, but excepts from the
prohibition signs advertising the sale or lease of the property upon which the signs
are located, signs indicating the name of the business or profession conducted on the
property, and signs identifying goods produced, sold, or services rendered on such
property. Ohio Rev. Code, §5516.02 (Supp. 1962). The court found that this was
not a reasonable classification, citing Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of
Evendale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E. 2d 189 (C.P. 1954), in support of its decision.
4 Federal Highway Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 904, 23 U.S.C. §131 (1958).
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for acquiring advertising rights providing the cost does not exceed five
percent of the cost of the right of way for such projects.5
The Ohio statute seeks to regulate advertising by the exercise of the
police power. Traditionally the use of the police power must have some
reasonable relation to the promotion, preservation, or protection of the
safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the public.6 If such a rela-
tionship does not exist, the exercise of the police power may operate to
deprive the owner of his property without due process of law.7
Cases concerned with the exercise of the police power with respect
to outdoor advertising date from the turn of the century.8 The early
restrictions usually related to public safety, health, or morals, and the
decisions gave safety rationales preferred treatment.9 Over the years,
general welfare considerations have been increasingly employed in assess-
ing the validity of such land use restrictions. 10 Gradually the courts began
to show willingness to predicate the validity of police regulation, at least
in part, upon aesthetic considerations."' Some courts stated that such
considerations might be utilized along with other factors justifying its
use.12 Others added that aesthetic purposes could not be a primary mo-
tivating factor.' 3 Only the courts in a few states indicated that they would
5 Ibid.
6 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Thomas Cusack Co. v.
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
7 St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929
(1911) ; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, supra note 6; Passiac v. Patterson Bill
Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 AtI. 267 (1905).
8 Ibid., In re Wilshire, 103 Fed. 620 (C.C. Cal. 1900); Haller Sign Works v.
Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920, 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 998
(1911); City of Rochester v. West, 29 App. Div. 125, 51 N.Y.S. 482 (1898); aff'd,
164 N.Y. 510, 58 N.E. 673 (1900).
9 St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, supra note 7, held that an
ordinance regulating size, location, and construction was permissible since fire and
high winds were a hazard, waste matter accumulated around such structures and
light and air were obstructed endangering health, and that billboards served as
shelter for criminals and immoral sexual acts. See also Thomas Cusack Co. v.
Chicago, supra note 7.
10 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309
(1930); In re Opinion of Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961) (discussed
infra).
11 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799 (1935); appeal disinissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935); Pritz v. Messer, 112
Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40
A.2d 177, 156 A.L.R. 568 (1944); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis,
supra note 10.
12 Barney and Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9
(1949); Kranz v. Town of Amherst, 192 Misc. 912, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1948);
Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex Civ. App. 1948); Conner
v. City of University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
3 Hitchman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W2d 306 (1956);
Frischkorn Construction Co. v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W2d 209 (1946);
Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 270 Mich. 205, 271 N.W. 823
(1937).
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have held regulations valid on aesthetic grounds alone if it had been
necessary.14 The statements were only dicta in most of the cases since it
was seldom necessary to use the aesthetic basis alone.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in a recent advisory opinion'u
concerning advertising regulation on interstate highways took a more
generous view of the reasons for enacting such provisions by finding that
the general welfare of the state would be improved by the promotion of
tourism, through increasing the attractiveness of roadside scenery. How-
ever, aesthetic considerations were held not to furnish the sole ground for
the exercise of the police power. The court assumed that a reasonable
relationship to safety existed without stating supporting reasons, other
than that the confusion and distraction of billboards would increase the
likelihood of accidents. The court could just as easily have reasoned that
the signs were an augmenting factor in highway safety by diverting atten-
tion sufficiently to reduce "highway hypnosis."
Since it was an advisory opinion, the absence of litigating parties could
account for the court's cursory examination of all the relevant facts. As a
result, the court used aesthetic grounds to be considerable extent in for-
mulating its decision despite its efforts to avoid it. It appears that courts
will still require that the prohibition of highway advertising have some
relationship to the safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the public
in order to meet the standards of due process. However, aesthetic con-
siderations will be molded to fit into the requirements in order to consti-
tute a valid reason for the exercise of the police power of the state.
The court in the principal case expressly rejected the argument that
aesthetic considerations could form the sole basis for a state validly exer-
cising its police power.1 Since economic interests are not given substantial
14 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean and Inland Co., 147 Fla. 840, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941); State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); General
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, supra note 11 at 187, 193 N.E.
2d at 816; Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.
2d 374 (1940).
15 In re Opinion of Justices, supra note 10.
16 Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, supra note 2. The federal courts have
not been confronted by the problem directly. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Dep't of Public Works, supra note 11; Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, 32 R.I. 580
(1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918). The Supreme Court in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), gave some encouragement to supporters of beauty as a
basis for state regulation by way of dicta in the opinion of Justice Douglas. How-
ever, several cases have stated that regulation of rights with respect to land by
restricting the character of its use must have a substantial relationship to public
safety, health, morals, or general welfare. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 6.
Since these two cases, the Supreme Court has required a substantial nexus
between the regulation and the object to be served by such exercise of the police
power only with respect to preferred constitutional values. Such rights were recog-
nized in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), and consisted of rights such as
freedom of speech, of the press, and of the exercise of religion. The Court does not
stringently apply the due process of equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
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protection by stringent application of either the due process or equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment,' 7 these interests have
received more protection under state constitutions because courts are not
bound to construe analogous state constitutional protections of property
rights in the same fashion. This is rejected in the result reached by the
court. Therefore, the court followed Ohio precedent by holding that due
process under the Ohio Constitution required more than aesthetic reasons
alone to sustain the statute's validity.' 8
The enunciation of the purposes of prohibiting regulation also seems
to aid the courts in upholding their constitutionality. Legislative preambles
serve as an expression of legislative judgment which should not be over-
turned by substitution of judicial determinations unless manifestly unrea-
sonable. Several statutes in which such elaboration was present were held
valid,' 9 and the courts have held that the relation of the prohibition to
highway safety was primarily for legislative determination. 20  The Ohio
statute constitutionally could not give any enunciation of its purpose as an
introduction to the code sections. The court, however, did not apply the
rule that such zoning restrictions are to be liberally construed.21
ment to state regulation of economic interests since Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934), in which the Court states that in order to strike down the regulation as
unconstitutional, it must be shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt. Id. at 539. See also West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Thus, the Court requires a lesser
standard with respect to prohibitions involving property rights, i.e. a rational nexus
between the purpose of the regulation and the regulation itself. Berman v. Parker,
supra, this note. The distinction between the rational and substantial basis is clearly
expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 625 (1942) at 639. Consequently, the Supreme Court would have
little difficulty in upholding the statute on review since the decision is incorrect in
terms of stare decisis on the federal question.
But the common pleas court combined state and federal constitutional issues in
deciding the principal case. Consequently, ultimate review by the United States
Supreme Court may be precluded by the insulating effect of the comingling of issues.
An independent state ground supporting the result may prevent granting of certiorari
by the Court even when alternative federal questions are presented. Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Eustis v.
Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893). See also The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in The
Supreme Court, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1375 (1961).
17 Supra, note 16.
18 Pritz v. Messer, supra note 11; Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112
Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925) ; Criterion Service v. City of East Cleveland, 55
Ohio L. Abs. 90, 88 N.E.2d 300, appeal dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E2d 495
(1949).
19 New York State Thruway v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y2d 151, 176 N.E.
2d 566 (1961) ; In re Opinion of Justices, supra note 10.
20 Ibid. The court in New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor
Court, supra, note 19 did not address itself to aesthetic considerations since it consti-
tuted but one of the purposes enunciated in the statute. Legislative judgment was an
important factor in the court's decision upholding the New York prohibition of
advertising.
21 Criterion Service v. City of East Cleveland, supra note 18, at 93, 88 N.E.2d
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The second major problem involved in the Ohio statute is the issue
of equal protection of law as guaranteed under the Ohio and federal
constitutions. Since the statute exempts from prohibition certain classes
of advertising devices, it creates a differing status between different abut-
ting landowners.
The court in Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Even-
dale 2 2 found that such a distinction is unreasonable since advertising
devices which are accessory to or part of the main business conducted on
the premises and advertising as a business have the same purpose of
attracting attention, the one being as likely to do so as the other. Another
court has taken a similar position as to this type of billboard advertising
classification.23 However, the Supreme Court of the United States in
analogous cases 24 has indicated that it would uphold similar classifications.
In the case of Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,25 the Supreme
Court made a virtually conclusive ruling on such a classification, holding
that a similar distinction between advertising devices was no denial of
equal protection of the laws. In the notable case of General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Department of Public Works,26 the Massachusetts court
found a fundamental difference in classes of billboards which were very
similar to the classification in the Ohio statute. However, the court did
not clarify its reasoning to any illuminating extent. Ohio precedent con-
cerning such classification is not in step with the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Another significant point wholly rejected by the court in the instant
case, is that the construction of the highway created the valuable advertising
interest in the land abutting the road. Defendant alleged that plaintiffs
suffered no loss in terms of value since the value was created by the state.
In balancing public and private interests, the manner in which the expecta-
tion arose seemingly is a relevant factor and was recognized as such in
New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court,27 although
it was not determinative of the case. In addition, plaintiffs might not have
had a loss as a result of their bargain if no road existed adjacent to their
at 302. ". . . only in the event of clear and convincing proof that the terms of such
ordinance are unreasonable, oppressive, and confiscatory -will a court intervene." See
also Urmstrom v. City of North College Hill, 114 Ohio App. 213, 175 N.E.2d 203
(1961).
22 Supra note 3.
23 Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority v. B. Crystal and Son, 2 App. Div.
2d 37, 153 N.Y.S2d 387 (1956).
24 Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935) ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 138 (1914); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
25 336 U.S. 106 (1949). New York City forbade any advertising vehicle on the
streets, but exempts vehicles which had business notices or advertisements of the
owner's products and which were not used mainly for advertising. The Court held
that this provision did not render the regulation a denial of equal protection of the
law. Local authorities have great leeway in traffic regulation and the equal protection
question may be determined by "practical considerations based on experience."
26 Supra note 11, at 211-212, 193 N.E. at 828.
27 Supra note 19, at 153, 176 N.E.2d at 569.
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property at the time of purchase. Thus, little or no bargained for consid-
eration in anticipated future profits from advertising was included in the
purchase price of the land. If this be so, the restrictions do not deprive
plaintiffs of any reasonable original expectation, but merely eliminate a
prospective windfall resulting from the fortuitous location of the highway.
Thus, plaintiff's loss does not seem so great as originally alleged.
The status of regulations concerning advertising remains an open
question in the light of numerous conflicting cases and the varying provi-
sions of state statutes regulating outdoor advertising. A legislature which
enunciates the purposes of its regulatory statute provides the court with an
easier basis for upholding the validity. The courts in other states seem
to permit more of a reliance upon aesthetic considerations than does Ohio.
The trend seems to indicate that these considerations will form the basis
of regulation by the use of police power to a greater extent in the future.
The liberal viewpoint of the United States Supreme Court leads to the
conclusion that equal protection of law will not serve as a substantial basis
for negating a statute's different treatment of similar, but not identical,
economic interests. As stated in the Highway Research Board analysis
of outdoor advertising along highways: "The capacity to promote, preserve,
or protect the public health, public safety, public morals, public welfare,
public comfort and convenience in keeping with the declared policy will
determine the validity of such regulation." Problems concerning due
process and equal protection of law will serve as increasingly insignificant
bars in upholding the validity of outdoor advertising regulation along
interstate highways if the trend of increasing permissibility of legislative
regulation in the public interest continues.
The Ohio courts will be faced with these problems in the considera-
tions of the principal case. The court should reverse the decision in the
instant case since the statute's validity could be sustained by liberally
construing the regulation and by permitting aesthetics to serve only as one
factor in the proper exercise of the police power. The court may make
itself a front runner in leading the trend toward more liberal interpretation
of the reasons for the valid exercise of the police power.28
28 This case will be heard by the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 13, 1964.
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